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COMMENTS
PHYSICIAN, HEAL THYSELF: BECAUSE THE
CURE, THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT ACT, MAY BE
WORSE THAN THE
DISEASE,
Incompetent physicians must be identified and then must either
improve their performance or be removed from practice.2
When a physician harms a patient through professional incompetence3 or
engages in unprofessional conduct,4 a peer review group5 at the facility
1. Cf S. GROSS, OF FoxES AND HEN HousEs: LICENSING AND THE HEALTH
PROFESSIONS 3 (1984). The author suggests that professional licensing groups cause more
problems with professional licensure than they resolve or prevent. Id.
2. Waxman, Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 943, 944
(1987).
3. See generally Franz v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 31 Cal. 3d 124, 642 P.2d
792, 181 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1982) (physician failed to adequately supervise inexperienced physi-
cian in surgery); State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Rogers, 387 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 1980) (physi-
cian used inappropriate treatment for arteriosclerosis); In re Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d 466, 663
P.2d 457 (1983) (physician used natural remedies instead of standard medical treatment).
4. Unprofessional conduct for a physician may include: making obscene phone calls,
Ewing v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 290 S.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 361 (1986); intimidating
opposition witnesses in a malpractice case, McDonnell v. Commission on Medical Discipline,
301 Md. 426, 483 A.2d 76 (1984); possessing unregistered submachine guns, Raymond v.
Board of Registration in Medicine, 387 Mass. 708, 443 N.E.2d 391 (1982); sexually abusing
patients, In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 449 A.2d 7 (1982); and evading taxes, Board of Medical
Examiners v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 102 A.2d 248 (1954).
In most cases, licensing laws permit licensure boards to take disciplinary action against a
physician guilty of criminal conduct. Such licensure board action supplements any criminal
charges brought by law enforcement agencies. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 37 (1975);
Arthurs v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 383 Mass. 299, 418 N.E.2d 1236 (1981) (physi-
cian prescribed controlled substances for illegal purposes); Board of Medical Examiners v.
Potter, 99 Nev. 162, 659 P.2d 868 (1983) (physician convicted of mail fraud); Story v. State,
721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo.) (physician abused patients sexually), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 459 (1986).
5. Traditionally, physicians use a method of self-regulation called peer review to evaluate
the type and quality of care that other physicians provide to patients. The premise behind peer
review is a belief that only a peer (someone with similar professional training) can effectively
judge the ability of another in the same profession. When a peer review group disciplines a
physician, the disciplinary action affects the physician's medical practice only at the facility the
peer review group represents. Most other professions also use peer review to ensure a mini-
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where the physician practices, or the state board of medical examiners that
issued the physician's medical license,6 may take disciplinary action against
the physician.7 A disciplinary action may have only a limited effect on a
physician because an individual disciplinary group has limited jurisdiction; a
peer review group governs a physician's practice only in the hospital or
clinic where the group sits,' and a licensure board acts as an arm of the
government only in the state where the board sits.9
If the disciplined physician has privileges at another hospital or a license
to practice in another state, which often is the case, the physician may con-
tinue to practice medicine with impunity.1 ° Thus, the physician can con-
tinue to harm patients in other facilities and states.'"
When a state medical board or peer review group 12 takes disciplinary ac-
tion against an allegedly incompetent physician, or a physician who may
mum level of competency within the profession. See S. GROSS, supra note 1, at 68-89; Dolin,
Antitrust Law Versus Peer Review, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1156 (1985). But see R. DERBY-
SHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1969).
6. Before a physician can practice medicine in a state, the physician must obtain a medi-
cal license from a state agency composed of physicians, generally called a state board of medi-
cal examiners [hereinafter licensure board]. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, PHYSICIANS' LICENSURE
AND DISCIPLINE: THE LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 54-
55 (1979). See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW (1986) [hereinafter MED-
ICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE].
7. Peer review groups may discipline a physician by issuing a letter of reprimand, re-
stricting the physician's privileges, suspending the physician's ability to use the facility for a
fixed period of time, or revoking the physician's privileges at that facility altogether. See FED-
ERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., A GUIDE TO THE
ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT 14 (1985) [hereinafter GUIDE TO MEDI-
CAL PRACTICE]. However, licensure boards are the ultimate peer review groups because they
control a physician's ability to practice medicine throughout an entire state. See R. DERBY-
SHIRE, supra note 5, at 76-90; F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 26-29; see, e.g., Withrow,
421 U.S. at 37 (listing the types of disciplinary actions the Wisconsin statute governing physi-
cians provides).
8. H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6385.
9. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
10. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 2-3, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6384, 6384-86.
11. Newspapers have chronicled incidents where physicians removed from practice in one
facility or community because of their incompetence have surfaced in another, only to repeat
the damage that caused the initial censure. See, e.g., Out-of-State Move Averts Discipline,
Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1988, at A17, col. 1; Army Had Evidence on Doctor Accused of Sodomy,
Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1985, at Dl, col. 1; Doctor Sued 14 Times But No State Hearing, Chi.
Tribune, May 10, 1982, at 1, col. 1; 9 Deaths Studied in Doctor's Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3,
1967, at 60, col. 3.
12. When text in this Comment applies equally to both state licensure boards and peer
review groups at health care facilities, this Comment will use the term "disciplinary groups."
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have breached professional standards of conduct, 3 the physician frequently
challenges the action in court.'4 While the litigation proceeds, courts gener-
ally permit the physician to continue treating patients.'" Thus, the discipli-
nary action appears futile to the disciplinary group because the
incompetent 16 physician continues to treat, and possibly harm, patients.'"
To make matters worse, the disciplinary group finds itself embroiled in ex-
pensive 18 and time-consuming 9 litigation because of the disciplinary action.
Consequently, disciplinary groups often are reluctant to sanction incompe-
tent physicians,20 a phenomenon referred to as the "brotherhood of
silence."'"
13. See R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 76-90.
14. See Dolin, supra note 5, at 1156; Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Congress Moves to
Bolster Peer Review: The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 316 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 960 (1987).
15. See R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 92; F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 47-
48.
16. This Comment concerns both physicians who are incompetent and those who have
engaged in unprofessional conduct. To avoid repetition, this Comment uses the term "incom-
petent" to describe both types of physicians.
17. E.g., Board of Medical Examiners v. Rogers, 387 So. 2d 937, 940 (Fla. 1980) (licen-
sure board ordered physician to stop using questionable treatment; reviewing court quashed
order); Board of Medical Examiners v. Potter, 99 Nev. 162, 164, 659 P.2d 868, 870 (1983) (per
curiam) (licensure board suspended physician's license after physician's second felony convic-
tion; reviewing court reinstated physician's license finding board decision not supported by
sufficient evidence); In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 559-60, 449 A.2d 7, 11-12 (1982) (licensure board
suspended license after finding the physician sexually abused juvenile patients; reviewing court
reversed suspension to consider standard of proof).
18. In an unpublished decision, the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon awarded approximately $2.2 million in damages in an antitrust suit brought by a physician
disciplined by a peer review group. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, and the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Patrick v.
Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd., 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
19. Although it is not unusual for a physician who brings suit against a licensure board or
peer review group to spend four or five years before the courts trying to reverse the disciplinary
action, e.g., Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1498 (dispute started in 1981 and lasted until 1988); Board of
Medical Examiners v. Potter, 99 Nev. 162, 659 P.2d 869 (1983) (dispute lasted six years); In re
Johnston, 99 Wash. 466, 663 P.2d 457 (1983) (dispute lasted seven years), Dr. Ronald E.
Clark, a general practitioner in Michigan, managed to stretch Michigan's efforts to revoke his
medical license from February 1956 to July 1968. R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 98-100.
During this period, at least nine of his patients died from apparent malpractice. Id. After his
assistant's suspicious death, the police chased Dr. Clark with bloodhounds for 12 hours in
snow and five degree weather. Id. The Michigan courts found Dr. Clark guilty of manslaugh-
ter and sent him to prison. Id.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 2-3, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6384-86; F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 38-39; Dolin, supra note
5, at 1156.
21. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 38-39, 114-15. But see Medical Malpractice:
Hearings on H.R. 5110 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 436 (1986) [hereinafter Medical Mal-
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Congress intends to end this "brotherhood of silence" with the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (the Act).2 2 The Act encourages
physicians to police their ranks by granting disciplinary groups extensive
immunity from liability. 23 The Act also establishes a computer network
linking state disciplinary groups to a national data bank that will trace and
report most disciplinary actions taken against physicians,24 as well as all
malpractice payments that insurance companies or individual physicians
make.25
The Act makes several fundamental changes in law. It introduces the fed-
eral government into physician licensing, an area that the states have gov-
erned exclusively.26 The Act creates a unique data bank, that the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) will administer, to
serve as a federal conduit for states to exchange information about disci-
plined physicians. 27 The Act grants immunity to disciplinary groups from
almost all traditional causes of action a physician might bring against these
groups, leaving the physician with little opportunity to seek redress for im-
proper or erroneous disciplinary actions. 28 Finally, the Act establishes no
practice Hearings] (statement of Raymond Scalettar, M.D., Board of Trustees, American Med-
ical Association).
22. Pub. L. No. 99-660, §§ 401-432, 100 Stat. 3784 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 11,101-11,152 (West Supp. 1988)), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-177, § 402, 101 Stat. 986,
1007 (1987) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11,137) [hereinafter the Act]. Some provisions of the
Act apply to other health professionals as well as to physicians. This Comment examines the
Act only as it applies to physicians.
23. Id. §§ 11,111-11,112.
24. Id. §§ 11,132-11,137.
25. Id. § 11,131.
26. MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 21.
27. The data bank the Act creates may be unique because the bank serves no distinct
federal program. Congress created the data bank solely to ensure that states communicate
with each other when they discipline physicians. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 2-3,
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6384-86. Most other federal data
banks directly support some federal program, even if states or other organizations also use
them. See, e.g., Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States, 816 F.2d 730,
732 & nn. 1-2, 733 & nn.3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing the Federal Bureau of Investigation
record systems and their uses), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988) (No. 87-1379); Medicare
and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 5, 101 Stat.
680, 689 (1987) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (requiring states to report
individuals convicted of Medicare or Medicaid fraud to the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS)).
28. The Act specifically bars suits in which physicians seek damages from a licensure
board or peer review group. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,111. A physician may seek injunctive or declar-
atory relief, H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6391. These actions will not provide much relief because the Act creates
a strong presumption that the disciplinary group acts properly when it takes action and thus
decreases the likelihood that the physician will succeed on the merits. "This immunity is not
contingent on the propriety of the behavior of the peer review body." Iglehart, supra note 14,
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safeguards for the DHHS to follow to protect the accuracy of the informa-
tion in the data bank.29
This Comment examines the development and effectiveness of physician
licensure and disciplinary processes in order to identify the reasons Congress
adopted the Act, intervening in an area historically governed by the states.
It reviews the ways in which the federal government uses computers as regu-
latory tools, and how the Act requires the DHHS to use computers to ac-
complish the Act's objectives. It discusses the legislative process Congress
followed, pointing out that, in theory, the Act fairly addresses the problems
Congress identified while drafting the Act. This Comment finds that Con-
gress paid too little attention to how the Act may harm physicians, and that
some provisions of the Act may violate the constitutional rights of physi-
cians with6ut promoting the Act's objectives. The Comment suggests ways
Congress or the DHHS could eliminate these harms. This Comment con-
cludes that the Act has the potential to reduce the number of incompetent
physicians, and consequently, the harm they inflict on their patients, but that
Congress did not go far enough to ensure that outcome.
30
at 962. Physicians still may bring suits against disciplinary groups for civil rights violations
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e (1982). 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,111.
29. The Act allows the Secretary of the DHHS to develop procedures that physicians can
use to challenge the accuracy of information contained in the data bank. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 11,136. In the proposed regulation, the DHHS assumes limited responsibility in this area.
"The Secretary proposes minimal involvement in the resolution of disputed information, leav-
ing this to the individual practitioner and the entity submitting the disputed report." National
Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Health Care Practitioners, 53 Fed.
Reg. 9264, 9267 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 60.13) (proposed Mar. 21, 1988). This
proposed policy is at odds with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986),
which requires federal agencies to ensure the accuracy of information kept in their records. A
federal official who violates the Privacy Act faces criminal penalties. Id. § 552a(i). The
DHHS has published notice of the Privacy Act system of records in which it will keep infor-
mation reported to the data bank, acknowledging that the Privacy Act controls recordkeeping
practices related to the data bank. New System of Records, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,721, 34,722
(1987). Consequently, the DHHS has conflicting rules.
The proposed regulation also conflicts with some federal court decisions. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to let the Federal Bureau of
Investigation deny responsibility for the accuracy of records it keeps in the National Crime
Information Center. The court said that "if the FBI has the authority to collect and dissemi-
nate inaccurate criminal information about private individuals without making reasonable ef-
forts to safeguard the accuracy of the information, it would in effect have the authority to libel
those individuals." Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Thus, the pro-
posed regulation adopts a position that probably will not survive judicial scrutiny.
30. This Comment does not address all of the issues the Act raises. The Comment does
not examine how the Act affects -federal-state government relationships, or analyze the Act's
impact on state relationships with physicians. The Act does raise significant issues in these
areas. If the Act proves effective, Congress could impose similar oversight on other profes-
sions with similar disciplinary problems. Cf Weber, "Still in Good Standing": The Crisis in
19881 1077
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I. REGULATING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY BY COMPUTER:
How IT EVOLVED
A. Regulating Physician Competence and Conduct
1. An Historical Overview of Physician Licensing
States regulate medicine through their historic police powers.3" As early
as 1760, colonies created boards of medical examiners to evaluate individuals
seeking to practice medicine and to issue licenses to those individuals the
boards found qualified.32 States appointed respected physicians to serve on
these boards, believing that only those who actually studied and practiced
medicine could judge whether others were competent to safely provide medi-
cal care to patients.33 In the 1889 case of Dent v. West Virginia,34 the United
States Supreme Court validated the authority of these boards to set stan-
dards and control the practice of medicine within a state.35
At first, licensing boards acted to keep unlicensed individuals, referred to
as "quacks," 36 from calling themselves physicians and practicing medicine.37
However, once these first boards found an individual qualified to practice
medicine, they rarely subjected the individual to further professional review
because few accurate measures existed of what was and was not good
medicine. 38 In the mid-1800's, physicians formed professional societies and
developed additional professional standards. 39 Boards used these standards
Attorney Discipline, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 58 (describing problems in the disciplinary
system applicable to lawyers).
31. "No precise limits have been placed upon the police power of a State, and yet it is
clear that' legislation which simply defines the qualifications of one who attempts to practice
medicine is a proper exercise of that power." Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 192-93
(1898).
32. R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 3, 9.
33. Id. at 4, 13, 32-44. But see OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH
AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT ON Li-
CENSURE AND RELATED HEALTH PERSONNEL CREDENTIALING 2 (1971) [hereinafter RE-
PORT ON LICENSURE], in which a federal work group concluded that "licensure may mean
only that licensed practitioners meet standards set by their own profession; it does not neces-
sarily mean that the State has evaluated the profession's standards and has approved these
standards as being valuable to society."
34. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
35. Id.
36. R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 6.
37. See S. GROSS, supra note 1, at 58. See generally R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 1-
12.
38. See R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 1-12; S. GROSS, supra note 1, at 52-59.
39. Physicians formed state medical societies as early as 1830. The American Medical
Association (AMA) was formed in 1847 to create nationally recognized academic standards
for physicians. S. GROSS, supra note 1, at 56-59. State licensing boards banded together in
1891 to form the Confederation of State Medical Examining and Licensing Boards, which later
1078 [Vol. 37:1073
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to monitor physician competence, and began to discipline licensed physi-
cians who violated the standards.4 From the late 1800's until today, medi-
cal licensure board responsibilities have changed very little.41 Their two
major responsibilities are issuing licenses to practice medicine and disciplin-
ing licensees.4 2
2. Licensure Boards and Physician Discipline
Generally, licensure boards discipline physicians for conduct described as
harmful to public health43 or involving moral turpitude." These broad cri-
teria merely serve as a base upon which individual state boards freely embel-
lish.4 5 Even today, one state disciplines conduct that another state does
not.4 6 Because the federal government has played no role in physician li-
became the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), the dominant professional group in
the area of physician licensing today. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, FSMB
HANDBOOK 1-3 (1987). See generally R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 6-9.
40. See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (the Supreme Court upheld New
York's authority to revoke the license of a physician after a New York court had convicted the
physician of a felony).
41. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 1 (physician licensure and discipline system
has been in place for 150 years). Compare Hawker, 170 U.S. at 189 (where the Supreme Court
held that licensure boards had the authority to discipline physicians as well as to issue medical
licenses) with MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 1 (which defines the
primary responsibilities of a licensure board as licensing and disciplining physicians).
42. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 1.
43. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (Wisconsin statute authorized the
licensure board to hold hearings to decide whether a physician's conduct was "inimical" to the
public health); see also Aitchison v. State, 204 Md. 538, 544, 105 A.2d 495, 498 ("[N]o person
has an absolute vested right to practice medicine, but only a conditional right which is
subordinate to the police power of the State to protect and preserve the public health."), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 880 (1954); cf Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5
(1957) ("Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State's grace.") (citing Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379 (1867)).
44. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 189 (plaintiff challenged the New York law that conditioned the
right to practice medicine upon the state's finding that the physician was of good character).
45. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 26-27. The professional societies, such as the
FSMB, established minimum educational standards for physicians to help states evaluate phy-
sician competence. All of the state licensure boards have adopted these standards. Medicare
and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1984: Joint Hearings on H.R. 5989 Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means and the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 55 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D., Executive Vice
President, Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States).
46. Compare McDonnell v. Commission on Medical Discipline, 301 Md. 426, 483 A.2d
76 (1984) (Maryland statute describes conduct that is subject to disciplinary action by medical
licensure board to include only acts directly related to a physician's medical skills) with Ray-
mond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 387 Mass. 708,443 N.E.2d 391 (1982) (Massachu-
setts law permits licensure board to discipline a physician for conduct unrelated to the
physician's medical skills, such as storing unregistered submachine guns).
1988] 1079
Catholic University Law Review
censing, each state has had complete sovereignty to decide what standards
physicians must meet to obtain and keep licenses in that state.4 7
Because medical licensing boards are administrative arms of the state,
courts defer to licensure board decisions just as they defer to any other state
administrative agency.48 Courts also defer to licensure boards because the
boards, comprised of physicians, possess specialized knowledge.4 9 In almost
all cases, courts uphold board actions if they are based on substantial evi-
dence 5° and are not arbitrary or capricious. 5 '
Despite what appears to be broad authority to act under state law and the
great deference state courts give board decisions, licensure boards generally
take few disciplinary actions.52 Various groups have criticized licensure
boards publicly over time, arguing that boards have not acted quickly
enough to discipline physicians who appear to the public to be woefully in-
competent or even criminally culpable.5 3
Even when licensure boards take disciplinary action, critics attack boards
as self-serving.5 4 Some physicians have successfully overcome disciplinary
actions by proving that a board acted to eliminate competition among physi-
47. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 10.
48. Id. at 177-90; see, e.g., Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903) (licensure board is an
administrative agency of the state with full governmental powers).
49. Dent v. 'West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889).
50. While courts generally review licensure board actions to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence, see, e.g., Boggs v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 288 S.C.
144, 146-47, 341 S.E.2d 635, 636 (1986); Story v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 721 P.2d
1013, 1017 (Wyo. 1986), statutes governing licensure board action may require the licensure
board to reach a decision based on clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Story, 721 P.2d at
1014; Fallon v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 441 P.2d 322, 326 (Wyo. 1968); F. GRAD &
N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 178-88. But see Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96, 102 (1981)
(licensure board may revoke a license based on a preponderance of the evidence standard).
For a discussion of whether the due process clause requires medical licensure boards to use a
standard of proof higher than the preponderance of the evidence, see In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550,
560-62, 449 A.2d 7, 12-13 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Dent, 129 U.S. at 124; R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 92-93.
52. State licensure boards are remarkably understaffed and underfunded, considering the
importance of their job. Boards are comprised of physicians asked to act as judges, and conse-
quently, the physicians are uncomfortable in that role. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at
38-39. Because boards are sued often, they often are reluctant to act. Id. at 139-40. Boards
must find that a physician has acted improperly, a task made difficult by disagreement among
physicians as to what is and is not proper medical practice. R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at
13.
53. REPORT ON LICENSURE, supra note 33, at 2; MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE,
supra note 6, at 12; see also Waxman, supra note 2, at 943-44; Doctors Rarely Lose Licenses,
Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
54. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6384, 6398-99; F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 115; S. GROSS, supra note
1, at 13; see also Waxman, supra note 2, at 943.
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cians,55 or to preclude physician extenders, like physician assistants and
nurse practitioners,56 from providing routine health care services that at one
time only physicians could provide. 7 Public interest groups and members
of state and federal legislatures also have criticized licensure boards for
agreeing to take no disciplinary action in return for a promise from a sub-
standard physician that he or she will leave the state and never practice
medicine there again, a bargain referred to as the "brotherhood of silence."5"
3. Peer Review Groups, Professional Societies, and Physician Discipline
Most physicians need more than a state license to practice medicine. To
properly treat patients, physicians need hospitals and the many services
available only in hospitals. Before a physician can use a particular hospital,
a peer review group at the hospital must grant the physician privileges.59 As
the physician provides medical care to a patient in hospital facilities, a peer
review group at the hospital monitors the physician's performance.' If the
physician fails to comply with hospital policy or procedure, provides sub-
standard care, or engages in unprofessional conduct, the peer review group
may investigate the problem and discipline the physician.6" Thus, physi-
cians must answer to both licensure boards and peer review groups.
Many states62 and professional organizations, such as the American Medi-
cal Association (AMA) 63 and the Federation of State Medical Boards
55. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988), rev'g, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Waxman, supra note 2, at 943.
56. REPORT ON LICENSURE, supra note 33, at app. B; see also Waxman, supra note 2, at
943.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 656 F.2d 131
(5th Cir. 1981); cf. GUIDE TO MEDICAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 28-29 (describing the role
of physician assistants and physician supervision of their activities).
58. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6384, 6385. The State of Pennsylvania promised not to take disciplinary action against
a physician if the physician promised to leave the state and never practice there again, pro-
vided the physician promised to enter public service with the Indian Health Service or some
other federal program. The United States Public Health Service, which provides personnel to
the Indian Health Service, was chagrined when the physician applied for a job and submitted
the Pennsylvania agreement with his application. Interview with Bruce Immerman, Senior
Health Services Officer, Division of Commissioned Personnel, Office of the Surgeon General,
United States Public Health Service (Nov. 25, 1987).
59. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 201-11.
60. See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 5, at 1156.
61. Id.; see, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
62. MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 14-15; see, e.g., Stronger
Rules on Disciplining Doctors Sought, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1988, at A7, col. 1.
63. See Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 430-46 (statement of Raymond
Scalettar, M.D.).
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(FSMB), 64 have attempted to make it easier for disciplinary groups to iden-
tify and discipline physicians who fall below acceptable professional stan-
dards.65 As part of this effort, both the AMA and the FSMB have
established data banks containing information about licensure and discipli-
nary actions taken against physicians.6 6 However, neither the AMA nor the
FSMB has the authority to force disciplinary groups to submit information
to the data banks. Consequently, the information in the data banks is in-
complete, 67 allowing some incompetent physicians to remain unreported.
Although the shortcomings of the physician disciplinary process are sig-
nificant,68 the process seems more effective today than at any time in the
past. The actual number of disciplinary actions licensure boards take has
increased by over 500% in the past twenty years.69 State legislatures have
enlarged the scope of authority licensure boards have to take disciplinary
actions, and have funneled more revenue into state disciplinary processes.7°
The professional societies in the medical community remain committed to
improving the quality of physicians in practice, and seem optimistic that the
medical community will resolve the remaining problems on its own.7 1
B. The Federal Government Develops Data Banks
Federal use of computers to monitor areas of federal concern is not new.72
By 1974, the government had computerized 86% of all its records.73 Gov-
ernment agencies initially computerized records because computers made
64. See Hearings, supra note 45, at 53-56 (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.).
65. MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 12.
66. Hearings, supra note 45, at 54-55 (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.); Medical
Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 430, 433-35 (statement of Raymond Scalettar, M.D.).
67. MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 16-17; H.R. REP. No. 903,
supra note 8, at 17, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6399-400.
68. R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 76-90; F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 38-39,
115-40; REPORT ON LICENSURE, supra note 33, at 31-33.
69. Between 1963 and 1967, licensure boards disciplined an average of 234.5 physicians a
year. R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 77. In 1984, 520,700 physicians practiced medicine
and licensure boards disciplined 1,381 of them. MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra
note 6, at 12. In fiscal year 1987, the State of Maryland had 1,245 disciplinary actions pend-
ing, but took formal action in only 11 cases. See Panel Regulating Md. Doctors SeldomActs to
Revoke Licenses, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
70. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 4-5; MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE,
supra note 6, at 14-15.
71. Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 443 (statement of Raymond Scalettar,
M.D.); Hearings, supra note 45, at 55-56 (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.).
72. Congress considered creating a single computer network in the mid-1960's for the
entire federal government, but decided against it. Instead, each federal agency developed its
own computer system. Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems,
Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 996 (1984).
73. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
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collecting and maintaining large quantities of information more efficient and
less expensive. 74 As computer technology developed, record collection and
maintenance led to record sharing.75 Record sharing encouraged record
matching, also referred to as computer matching.76 The government uses
computer matching for oversight purposes,77 and to detect fraud and abuse
in benefit programs.78 Thus, computers have become a regulatory tool that
is more efficient and less expensive than traditional methods of regulation.79
Congress has expressed concern that federal recordkeeping by computer
allows the government to intrude into private lives.80 Given the enormous
scope of federal records, an individual or organization that misuses informa-
tion in a federal record system has the potential to harm most of the Ameri-
JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 33-35 (Comm. Print 1974).
74. In 1972, computers could store the equivalent of 20 pages of personal information on
every person in the United States and could retrieve an individual record in 30 seconds. COM-
MITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, AND COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY 835 (1976).
75. See Shattuck, supra note 72, at 993; see, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Program;
Provision of Services in Interstate IV-D Cases, 53 Fed. Reg. 5246 (1988) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pts. 301-03, 305) (creating central registry for information concerning parents who fail
to keep up child support).
76. Shattuck, supra note 72, at 996. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) & (m)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), authorizes federal agencies to conduct computer matches. The Office
of Management and Budget issued guidelines for federal agencies to use when planning com-
puter matching programs. Revised Supplemental Guidance for Conducting Matching Pro-
grams, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,656 (1982).
77. See. e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (New York statute requires oversight of
the narcotic prescriptions physicians write); see also Matching Program-HHS Physician
Records/Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc. Disciplinary Records,
Notification of Matching Program, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,133 (1985) [hereinafter Matching Pro-
gram] (federal agency matched lists of federal physicians against the FSMB Disciplinary Data
Bank to learn whether state medical boards had disciplined the physicians for activities per-
formed outside the scope of the physicians' federal duties).
78. See, e.g., Computer Matching Programs-United States Department of Agriculture
and United States Postal Service Personnel in Missouri Participating in United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture Programs and Cross-State March [sic] of Food Stamp Program Partici-
pants in Illinois and Kansas, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,738 (1987); Computer Matching Program-
Postal Service/California State Employment Development Department, 52 Fed. Reg. 35,010
(1987).
79. "[Computer matching] is the Federal Government's most cost-effective tool for verifi-
cation or investigation in the prevention of and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse." Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 711 (1986) (citing 7 THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY ON
COST CONTROL, MANAGEMENT OFFICE SELECTED ISSUES-INFORMATION GAP IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 90 (1984) (commonly referred to as the Grace Commission
Report)).
80. Shattuck, supra note 72, at 987-89.
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can population.8 1 To prevent such misuse, Congress enacted safeguards that
federal agencies must follow to protect the integrity of these records.82 With
these safeguards in place, Congress continues to establish new information-
collection activities and to authorize more computer oversight.8
3
Despite the safeguards Congress created, individuals identified in comput-
erized government records have experienced a variety of troubles, some seri-
ous, that simple exchanges of records can generate.84 Congress cannot
adequately protect individuals identified in government records from the
types of harm these exchanges may cause,8 5 because the harm generally is
not caused by deliberate abuse or misuse of records. The harm is caused by
81. In 1974, Congress heard testimony that the government and private organizations
keep between 10 and 20 files on the average American. Project, Government Information and
the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1224 (1975) (citing Records Maintained by Gov-
ernment Agencies: Hearings on H.R. 9527 and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1972) (statement of Rep. Patten)).
82. At the close of the first session of the 100th Congress, the Senate passed the Computer
Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (1987) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 & 40 U.S.C.), which the House of Representatives had passed earlier in the year.
Under this law, the National Bureau of Standards must develop computer security measures
for government-wide implementation. Id. § 3(2)(d)(4). Government agencies must use the
new system for records that contain "sensitive information," defined as "any information, the
loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of which could adversely affect the
national interest or the conduct of Federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are
entitled." Id.; see also Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Techno-
logical Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 897 n.27 (1984); Shattuck, supra note 72, at 996-98.
83. In addition to establishing the national data bank in the Act, Congress recently au-
thorized more computer-assisted oversight to help detect fraud and abuse in the Medicare and
Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 5, 101 Stat. 680, 689 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Senate passed legislation to facilitate com-
puter matching and create additional safeguards for records used or created in the matching
process. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1987, S. 496, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S7042 (daily ed. May 21, 1987). At the time of publication, the House
of Representatives had not yet considered the Senate bill.
84. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), the Social Security Administration terminated
food stamps and welfare benefits it paid on behalf of a child because the child had no social
security number due to her parents' belief that such a number would rob her of her spirituality.
Id. at 696. This is a striking case because the Court found that the government's interest in the
efficient operation of its programs outweighed the child's interest in adhering to her religious
beliefs. Id. at 699-700. Ultimately, the Social Security Administration assigned the child a
number and used that number to process the child's claims, even though the child and her
parents refused to use the number when applying for benefits. Id. at 701 n.7.
In 15,844 Welfare Recipients v. King, 474 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Mass. 1979), the Massachu-
setts Department of Public Welfare conducted a computer match of records about individuals
receiving welfare and state employment records to identify people who had become ineligible
for welfare because of employment. Id. at 1381. The district court upheld Massachusetts' use
of computer matching for this purpose, despite testimony from experts that people living at the
poverty level move in and out of employment status with such rapidity that information gained
from a computer match at a fixed point in time is unreliable. Id. at 1382-83.
85. See generally Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977).
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everyday errors and mistakes that even the most careful people make.86 As
computers transmit information further from the original source of the in-
formation, the accuracy of the information becomes more difficult to ver-
ify.87 Ultimately, federal decisionmakers may determine an individual's
entitlement to basic necessities, such as food stamps or Medicare, based on
erroneous information obtained from computerized records about which the
individual knows nothing. 88
Public interest groups, corporations, and private citizens have petitioned
the courts for protection from government record collection, maintenance,
and dissemination.8 9 In California Bankers Association v. Shultz,9  these
groups united to challenge the constitutionality of the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act.9 Although the plaintiffs
alleged ten separate constitutional violations, the Supreme Court decided
that none of the allegations had sufficient merit for the Court to strike down
any provision of the Bank Secrecy Act.92 Although the Court has said on
more than one occasion that the scope of records the government keeps on
private individuals gives the government the potential to invade individual
rights,93 the Court has not struck down any statute creating computerized
recordkeeping schemes. 94
86. See, e.g., id. at 287-89.
87. The Privacy Act of 1974, in recognition of the errors that occur when information is
transmitted from one record to another, requires federal agencies to gather information from
the individual to whom information pertains whenever possible. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
88. See Gerety, supra note 85, at 287-88.
89. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 595 (1977) (plaintiffs were private individuals);
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 41 (1974) (plaintiffs included the American
Civil Liberties Union, the California Bankers Association, and private customers of banks in
California); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 752 (1986) (plaintiffs were physicians subject to state law requiring physicians to
report abortions); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1976) (plaintiffs were candidates for pub-
lic office subject to the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971).
90. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
91. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 & 31 U.S.C.).
92. The plaintiffs alleged that the Bank Secrecy Act was an unreasonable search and
seizure, that it compelled self-incrimination, that it violated rights of free speech and freedom
of association, and that it denied them due process. California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 41.
93. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06; California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 311-13 (1972).
94. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986), the Court affirmed the unconstitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute requiring physi-
cians to report information about women who obtained abortions. The statute made these
records available for public inspection and copying. Id. at 766. The statute did not provide for
computer maintenance or transmission of these records. However, Thornburgh may be of
critical importance in determining how the Court would treat a recordkeeping scheme like that
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Lower federal courts have held that, in some instances, government infor-
mation collection and dissemination activities have exceeded the governmen-
tal interest the records were collected to promote.95 However, these
instances are rare. Courts are more likely to find that the information needs
of the government outweigh the interests of an individual.
9 6
C. Medical Licensure Actions Form a Federal Data Bank
1. Professional Society Oversight of Physician Discipline
Computers have greatly enhanced the ability of the professional societies
to collect and disseminate disciplinary information.97 The FSMB computer-
ized its disciplinary information in the early 1980's with the help of a con-
tract from the DHHS. 98 By 1984, FSMB's computerized disciplinary data
bank could verify the credentials of an applicant for a medical license in one
minute and five seconds. 99 The AMA started collecting and disseminating
similar information more recently as an adjunct to its comprehensive com-
puter file on medical school graduates, called the physician Masterfile. t°
Both the FSMB and the AMA generate monthly computer reports of disci-
plinary actions and disseminate the reports to state licensure boards.l'O
The AMA and the FSMB obtain the information for their data banks
from state licensure boards, and assume no responsibility for the accuracy of
the information they report each month."12 Thus, the information in these
data banks is only as accurate and complete as the information state licen-
which the Act creates, because Thornburgh indicates a willingness on the part of the Court to
prohibit government recordkeeping concerning fundamental rights in general, not only first
amendment rights. See generally California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 85-91 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
95. See, e.g., Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d
1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
96. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598; Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80-81 (1976). But see Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 766; Utz, 520 F.2d at 481-82.
97. Hearings, supra note 45, at 54-55 (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.).
98. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, PHYSICIAN DISCIPLINARY DATA BANK
(1986) [hereinafter FSMB DATA BANK].
99. Hearings, supra note 45, at 55 (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.).
100. Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 434 (statement of Raymond Scalettar,
M.D.).
101. Id. at 443 (statement of Raymond Scalettar, M.D.); Hearings, supra note 45, at 55
(statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.).
102. For example, the FSMB offers this disclaimer with regard to its data bank:
The data contained in the Bank are a direct reflection of the completeness and accu-
racy of the actions reported to it. Therefore, despite the significant quality control
measures employed, the Federation makes no representations or warranties, either
express or implied, as to the accuracy of the information reported and assumes no
responsibility for errors or omissions that may be contained therein.
FSMB DATA BANK, supra note 98.
1086 [Vol. 37:1073
Physician, Heal Thyself
sure boards provide. At times, the state boards provide incomplete, mislead-
ing, and incorrect information." 3 Further, neither the AMA nor the FSMB
has the authority to force state boards to submit information to private data
banks, so states unwilling to participate might provide no information."
2. Federal Intervention Into Physician Discipline
The federal government had little reason to become involved in medical
licensure until recently because in 1920 the Supreme Court held, in Johnson
v. Maryland, ' 5 that states could not impose licensure or other requirements
on individuals engaged in federal work.'0 6 Consequently, federal physicians
did not need state licenses, and the federal government itself had no licensing
scheme.
The federal government acquired a vested interest in physician licensing
when Congress created the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the early
1960's.'0 7 As the number of federal dollars going to state-licensed physi-
cians increased to twenty-five percent of the total spent on health care in the
United States,' the federal government's interest in physician licensing and
103. The United States Public Health Service (PHS) has had bad luck with the data it has
obtained from computer matches. The first computer match, see Matching Program, supra
note 77, resulted in three "hits" (a "hit" is a match between records in two computer systems),
and all three hits were erroneous or misleading. Cf infra note 165 (erroneous computer match
concerning a nurse). In one case, the licensure board reported only its own action to the data
bank. It did not report that the United States government challenged the board action as an
effort by the state to keep physician assistants from practicing in the state. Nor did it report
that the Georgia court reversed the Board on remand from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 656 F.2d
131 (5th Cir. 1981), restoring the physician's license. United States v. Composite State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, No. C 79-1943 A (N.D. Ga. June 10, 1983); Letter from Assistant Sur-
geon General James H. Eagen, Deputy Director, Office of Personnel Management, United
States Public Health Service, to Dr. Bryant L. Galusha, M.D., Executive Director, FSMB
(Jan. 28, 1986) (informing the FSMB of erroneous match). In the second match, the discipli-
nary board legitimately disciplined the physician, but failed to clarify the reason for the disci-
pline in its report to the FSMB data bank. The PHS investigated further and found that the
physician himself had not violated state law. In re Fort Help, No. D-2109, California Bd. of
Medical Quality Assurance (Mar. 23, 1979). Instead, the board had disciplined the physician
for the actions of the staff at a clinic where he donated his time. Id. at 7. The staff billed the
state for care the physician provided at the clinic, although the physician told the staff not to
bill his time. Id. at 6.
104. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 1-2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6384, 6384-85; MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 18. See
generally Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 457-61 (statement of Raymond
Scalettar, M.D.).
105. 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
106. Id. at 57.
107. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 2-3; MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE,
supra note 6, at 21.
108. MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 21.
19881 1087
Catholic University Law Review
the quality of medical care paid for by federal dollars increased. This inter-
est fostered numerous federal studies of licensure boards and medical prac-
tice, 1° 9 describing the inadequacies of the licensure and disciplinary
processes." 0 The problems these studies revealed, and the potential Con-
gress recognized in the private disciplinary data banks, apparently led Con-
gress to conclude that the time was ripe for federal intervention."1 '
3. The Congressional Solution
Congress had a variety of issues to contend with as it tried to find a way to
reduce the number of incompetent physicians and the amount of harm they
inflict. First, Congress had to find a way for the federal government to be-
come involved in physician discipline without preempting the states' historic
sovereignty to issue medical licenses and discipline their licensees." 2 Con-
gress had no comparable concern about peer review groups at hospitals and
other medical facilities because these groups are not part of state govern-
ments, raising no conflict in federal-state relationships." 3 Thus, Congress
decided to impose precise disciplinary procedures and reporting require-
ments on peer review groups, while it imposed only general reporting re-
quirements on state licensure boards." 4
109. See id.; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, CREDENTIALING
HEALTH MANPOWER (1977) (Appendix III lists 10 reports that the Department of Health,
Edcation, and Welfare (now DHHS) prepared between June 1971 and July 1977). In addi-
tion, the DHHS awarded several grants to health licensure specialists, who prepared additional
reports. Even Congress authorized a number of studies to be carried out by the General Ac-
counting Office. See Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 422-23 (statement of
Raymond Scalettar, M.D.); MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 21.
110. MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 21.
111. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 1-2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6384, 6384-85. As early as 1984, the General Accounting Office recommended
that Congress create a national data bank concerning disciplined physicians in order to protect
Medicare and Medicaid. Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 422-23 (statement of
Raymond Scalettar, M.D.). A variety of groups from the private sector and individuals from
within the government itself testified that the data bank was needed badly. Id. at 374-75 (state-
ment of the Washington Business Group on Health), 383-85 (statement of the FSMB), 461
(discussion between Rep. Wyden and Ross N. Rubin of the AMA Division of Legislative
Activities).
112. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1502 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1658
(1988) (hospital peer review group composed of partners of hospital and associated clinic).
Another reason Congress was not concerned with peer review in hospitals and clinics stems
from Medicare and Medicaid. In order to receive reimbursement from the federal government
for care furnished to Medicare and Medicaid patients, the health care facility must meet cer-
tain federal standards of care. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 208-11.
114. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11,112, 11,133, 11,135 (imposing detailed hearing proce-
dures on peer review groups, requiring hospitals and clinics to report disciplinary actions to
state licensing boards, and requiring hospitals to verify credentials of physicians prior to grant-
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Next, Congress needed to improve the quality and frequency of peer re-
view.' Because peer review groups and experts on peer review identified
fear of being sued as the greatest deterrent to vigorous peer review, Congress
drafted a plan giving sweeping immunity to peer review actions.' 16 Several
federal agencies strongly opposed giving immunity to peer review groups
because these groups had tried to hide antitrust activity under the guise of
disciplinary action in the past.' Congress also tied the immunity to a re-
quirement that peer review groups report their disciplinary actions to state
licensure boards.' 8
Finally, Congress had to implement this comprehensive oversight pro-
gram without significantly increasing the federal deficit. 1 9 Because Con-
gress had great success with computer oversight in the past,120 and because
the professional societies already had fully operational data banks identify-
ing disciplined physicians,' 2' Congress chose to build its oversight program
around computers. Congress permitted the DHHS, the agency charged with
operating the new program, to operate the data bank by contracting with the
private sector. 122
With the data bank, Congress crafted a law that addressed almost all of
the problems that critics of the physician disciplinary process had raised,
without creating a massive new federal bureaucracy, and without overtly
interfering with the historic police power of the states. Although both the
AMA and the FSMB touted disciplinary data banks as the best method of
identifying and restricting substandard physicians, they both strongly op-
posed Congress' plan to create a federal data bank, urging Congress to leave
the data banks to the private sector.' 23 Other professional societies favored
ing privileges) with id. § 11,132 (requiring licensure boards to report disciplinary actions to the
DHHS) and id. § 11,137 (giving licensure boards discretion to verify credentials prior to issu-
ing a license to a physician).
115. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,111.
117. Iglehart, supra note 14, at 961.
118. The AMA objected to tying peer review group immunity to the reporting require-
ment. Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 439 (statement of Raymond Scalettar,
M.D.).
119. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that if the DHHS implemented the pro-
gram itself, start-up costs for the proposed data bank would reach $30 million in the first year
and $10 million each successive year for ongoing operations. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8,
at 4-5, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6387.
120. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,134(b).
123. In congressional hearings, representatives of the AMA and FSMB offered these justifi-
cations for keeping the data banks in the private sector:
The [data collection] activity should not reside at HHS, as the track record at HHS
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creating a federal data bank.' 24 All of the professional societies praised the
provision of the Act that granted immunity to peer review groups.125 The
praise may have been fostered by a $2.2 million judgment the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon entered against a peer review
group, when a jury found that the group's disciplinary action was antitrust
activity in disguise.' 26
II. OVERVIEW OF THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
ACT OF 1986
A. Congressional Findings
Congress specifically found that states alone could neither effectively re-
duce malpractice nor reduce the number of incompetent physicians in prac-
tice. Congress also found that peer review processes could solve the
problems that substandard physicians cause, provided that peer review
proved effective. To make peer review effective, Congress eliminated the
threat of liability hanging over peer review organizations.
27
does not instill confidence that a system established by HHS would operate prop-
erly.... HHS collection and release of information on physician Medicare payments
proved to be a disaster.... [Other] information, widely publicized in the media, was
highly misleading and it may have damaged permanently the reputations of compe-
tent providers.
Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 441-42 (statement of Raymond Scalettar,
M.D.); see also Iglehart, supra note 14, at 961.
Without strong and compelling cause it appears unnecessary and needlessly intrusive
to implement a [federal] program which would interfere with the authority and re-
sponsibility which has been traditionally within the purview of the various states....
In fact, I would suggest that the states may well view such an action as the Federal
Government's first step into the field of medical licensure.
Hearings, supra note 45, at 55 (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.).
124. Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 461 (statement of Raymond Scalettar,
M.D.); Iglehart, supra note 14, at 960-61.
125. Iglehart, supra note 14, at 960-61.
126. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (hold-
ing the state-action doctrine does not immunize hospital peer review actions from antitrust
liability because there is no active state supervision).
127. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,101. Congress passed the Act with amazing speed and no obvious
attempts to reconcile strongly conflicting views. Iglehart, supra note 14, at 960-61. Congress
appropriated the data bank concept developed by the FSMB and the AMA even though both
groups hoped their respective data banks would dominate the profession. See Medical Mal-
practice Hearings, supra note 21, at 458 (statement of Ross N. Rubin); Hearings, supra note 45,
at 53-56 (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.). Further, Congress enacted the Act with no
formal comments from the DHHS. This is a curious fact, because Congress charged the
DHHS with running the data bank. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 22, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6405; see also Iglehart, supra note 14, at 960-63.
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B. Promoting Peer Review
Part A of the Act eliminates many of the deterrents to more effective and
aggressive peer review of physician competence and conduct. It provides
immunity under federal and state law from damage suits against peer review
groups and individuals acting in support of these groups,128 preserving only
civil rights actions. 29 The Act also precludes antitrust actions against peer
review organizations unless the United States or a state attorney general
brings the action.130  Because courts have found that peer review groups
have used peer review to restrain competition, the Act also prohibits physi-
cians in direct economic competition with the physician facing discipline
from sitting on the peer review group.1
3 1
The grant of immunity in the Act is conditioned on two factors. First, a
peer review group must provide sufficient due process protections to a physi-
cian subjected to peer review action. The Act specifically details the proce-
dures Congress deemed to be appropriate due process, and creates a
rebuttable presumption that the peer review group met the due process re-
quirements even if the group did not follow the procedures in the Act.
132
Second, the peer review group must take the disciplinary action in the rea-
sonable belief that the action will further quality health care.
1
33
128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,111. The Act extends immunity to witnesses who appear before the
group, private investigators, and most importantly, other physicians who may have worked
with the suspect physician in the past and who could have been aware of the suspect physi-
cian's deficiencies.
129. Id. The legislative history indicates that the immunity provisions do not bar physi-
cians from seeking injunctions or declaratory relief against peer review groups who propose
disciplinary actions. See supra note 28.
130. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,1 1(a). The $2.2 million antitrust judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon in Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988), horrified the medical profession generally because it resulted
from a routine peer review action. Dolin, supra note 5, at 1156-57. This provision of the Act
may be what the medical community wanted most from Congress. See Medical Malpractice
Hearings, supra note 21, at 437-39 (statement of Raymond Scalettar, M.D.); Iglehart, supra
note 14, at 960-63.
131. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,112. While this provision of the Act aims at ensuring that peer
groups do not engage in anticompetitive activity, see H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 2-3,
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6385, it arguably may undermine
the effectiveness of the peer review process in areas with relatively small numbers of physi-
cians. The theory behind peer review is that only someone with comparable training and expe-
rience is capable of judging a professional, like a physician. See supra note 5. Thus, if someone
is a true peer, that person is by definition in competition to provide medical services identical
to those of the physician he or she must evaluate. Id. Peer review groups may be forced to
hire physicians from other cities to sit on disciplinary panels in order to comply with the terms
of the Act and also provide meaningful review.
132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,112.
133. Id.
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The Act gives peer review groups immunity and flexibility to summarily
suspend a physician's hospital or clinic privileges for up to fourteen days
when the physician poses an imminent danger to the health of his or her
patients. 134 However, the peer review group must restore the physician's
privileges at the end of the fourteen days, or when the physician no longer
poses an imminent danger to patients, regardless of whether the peer review
group has completed its investigation and deliberations concerning formal
disciplinary action.'35
Part A also conditions the peer review group's immunity on faithful re-
porting of disciplinary actions to the national data bank. 136 It further re-
quires the DHHS to investigate failures to report disciplinary actions. If the
DHHS finds that a peer review group failed to report to the data bank, the
Act requires the DHHS to publish the name of the group in the Federal
Register, and the group loses immunity under the Act for three years.1 37
C. Reporting Disciplinary Information
Part B of the Act requires a variety of individuals and organizations to
report disciplinary actions, as well as malpractice payments and settlements,
to both state licensure boards and the national data bank.' 3 ' The Act estab-
lishes a different trigger for reporting by each type of individual or organiza-
tion required to report. Insurance companies and physicians must report all
money paid in settlement of malpractice claims or judgments, regardless of
the amount, although the Act precludes any presumption of malpractice
from such a report.' 39
134. Id. § 11,112(c). Because a truly incompetent physician can kill, peer review groups
must have the power to act immediately when they perceive such a threat.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 11,111 (b). The AMA and the FSMB strongly objected to any ties between im-
munity and reporting under the Act. See Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21, at 429
(statement of Raymond Scalettar, M.D.); Hearings, supra note 45, at 55 (statement of Bryant
L. Galusha, M.D.). If both groups believed that the only way to stop incompetent physicians
was through the use of a computer network similar to their own respective data banks, it seems
they should have favored some sanction that would ensure reporting. Their protests create the
impression that of the two parts of the Act, the immunity provision was the more important to
them.
137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,111(b).
138. Insurance companies and physicians must report malpractice payments directly to the
data bank and to the state licensure board in the state where the plaintiff brings the claim. 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 11,131(a), 11,134. Peer review groups need report only to state licensure boards.
Id. § 11,133. Medical licensure boards must report directly to the data bank. Id. § 11,132.
139. Id. §§ 11,131, 11,137(d). Congress decided not to set a dollar threshold for reports of
malpractice payments because Congress believed that a physician who made many small mal-
practice payments over a short period of time might deserve scrutiny. H.R. REP. No. 903,
supra note 8, at 13-14, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6396.
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Health care facilities must report any disciplinary action resulting from a
peer review process if it affects a physician's privileges' 4  to practice for
more than thirty days. Health care facilities also must report to licensure
boards whenever a physician surrenders his or her privileges while under
investigation or in exchange for an agreement from the facility to forego an
investigation. 41  The Act requires state licensure boards to report to the
national data bank any type of disciplinary action they take, from a verbal
reprimand to actual revocation of the physician's license.'
42
All individuals and organizations required to report disciplinary actions
under part B face sanctions if they fail to report. 143 If an insurance company
or individual physician fails to report a payment made to settle a malpractice
claim or judgment, regardless of the amount, the DHHS may impose a
$10,000 civil penalty on the physician or insurance company. 1" If a health
care facility fails to report a disciplinary action, the Act makes the facility
ineligible for the immunity granted by part A of the Act. ' 45 If a state licen-
sure board fails to report any action affecting a physician's license status, the
DHHS will designate another organization to report to the data bank in
place of the licensure board. 146
Part B of the Act also requires health care facilities to check the informa-
tion in the data bank before issuing privileges to practice at that facility to
physicians who initially apply for privileges, and to recertify the licensure
status of each physician already with privileges every two years thereafter. 147
If a facility fails to inquire, a court will deem the facility to have known any
adverse information it could have learned had it checked with the data
140. The Act defines "privileges" as follows: "'[C]linical privileges' includes privileges,
membership on the medical staff, and the other circumstances pertaining to the furnishing of
medical care under which a physician or other licensed health care practitioner is permitted to
furnish such care by a health care entity." 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,151(3).
141. Id. § 11,133.
142. Id. § 11,132.
143. Id. §§ 11,131(c), 11,132(b), 11,133(c).
144. Id. § 11,131(c).
145. Id. § 11,133(c).
146. Id. § 11,132(b). The effect of this last sanction is unclear. The Act permits the
DHHS to exclude a state licensure board from the system and to replace it with another organ-
ization. Id. § 11,133(c)(2). However, states, in almost all cases, have only one organization
capable of generally evaluating physicians and taking disciplinary action. The FSMB and the
AMA are the only alternative sources for information about disciplinary actions, and both are
fed information from the licensure boards. This section of the Act seems to have the most
significant preemptive effect on state law of any provision in the Act, but the effect merely
excludes the licensure board from the data bank without interfering with the board's authority
to license and discipline physicians. Id.
147. Id. § 11,135.
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bank. 148 If a facility relies on information obtained from the data bank, the
Act absolves the facility from liability for its reliance on that data unless the
facility knew the information obtained was false. 149  Medical licensure
boards may obtain information from the data bank at their discretion.
50
III. PHYSICIANS UNDER ATTACK: WHERE DOES IT HURT?
During the legislative process, Congress focused almost exclusively on the
effect of the Act on licensure boards and peer review groups. '15  Congress, as
well as the witnesses who testified before it and the federal agencies reporting
to it, spent little time studying the effect of the Act on individual physicians.
Yet the Act may have a very serious impact on individual physicians, and in
some cases may strip a physician of his or her ability to practice medicine.
A. Legislative AIDS (Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome)
Because disciplinary groups often take punitive action against physicians
for improper reasons,' 5 2 physicians can expect these groups to continue act-
ing in response to improper motives. Due to the Act, physicians have lost
much of their ability to defend themselves against improper peer review ac-
tions. Like victims of the disease AIDS, 153 physicians could become de-
fenseless prey to opportunistic and destructive peer review groups.
Under the Act, a physician may still bring an action against a peer review
group for damages in tort or under antitrust laws, but only if the physician
can first rebut the Act's presumption that a disciplinary group's action is,
more likely than not, reasonably related to the furtherance of quality health
148. Id. § 11,135(b). Hospitals may need to keep complete records of all data bank inquir-
ies to ensure that they can prove they checked the data bank before allowing the physician to
practice at the hospital or clinic. Otherwise, hospitals face almost certain liability for any
harm the physician commits in the facility.
149. Id. § 11,135(c).
150. Id. § 11,137. Had Congress required state boards to check the data bank before issu-
ing a license, it would have interfered directly with the licensure process itself, as established
by the state legislature in the state's medical practice act. Such a requirement could have
resulted in a de facto federal licensure standard, preempting differing state standards.
151. The legislative history of the Act, H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 2-3, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6384-86; the testimony of the two major
professional associations, Medical Malpractice Hearings, supra note 21 (statement of Raymond
Scalettar, M.D.) and Hearings, supra note 45 (statement of Bryant L. Galusha, M.D.); and the
articles in professional journals, such as Iglehart, supra note 14, concentrate on peer review
groups and the disciplinary process.
152. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
153. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) attacks the body's immune system,
leaving the body unable to defend itself against invading viruses that human antibodies nor-
mally could overcome. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 10 (1986).
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care.1 54 Because medicine is not an exact science, physicians usually have
several options from which to choose when treating a patient.1" As long as
a disciplinary group can use the wisdom of hindsight to assert that a physi-
cian should have used method B instead of method A, the group's action is
reasonably related to furthering quality health care. If the physician can
overcome the initial presumption, he or she can go forward with the suit, but
must prevail on the merits to receive any relief. In the past, physicians pre-
vailed against disciplinary groups only in approximately twenty-nine percent
of the cases brought.156
While the Act may not affect the number of physicians who prevail on the
merits, it will reduce substantially the number of physicians able to reach the
merits, or willing to risk paying the disciplinary group's legal expenses if the
physician loses.' 57 Disciplinary groups should be less reluctant to take disci-
plinary actions, as Congress intended, because of their newly acquired fed-
eral immunity. However, more vigorous peer review under the Act will be
costly to individual physicians, because the threshold at which a disciplinary
group is immunized is so low that even when a disciplinary group acts for
improper reasons, it probably will be able to show that its actions were in
some way related to furthering quality health care.
B. Extending the Life of a Physician's Reputation
Although the Act's immunity provisions for disciplinary groups make it
difficult for a physician to obtain relief from improper disciplinary action, a
physician can overcome them. Consequently, part A of the Act provides
some hope for superficial recovery of a physician's reputation. If a physician
prevails against a disciplinary group, the physician collects his or her dam-
ages, has his or her professional disabilities officially removed, and continues
practicing medicine. Part B, however, provides no hope of recovery for the
physician's professional life.
Part B of the Act creates a presumption that medical licensure boards and
health care facilities must monitor a physician reported to the data bank
either because the physician did something wrong, or because the physician
may have done something wrong.' 5 ' Thus, a report to the data bank de-
154. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,112.
155. Cf. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 2 (the greater range of choices available to
physicians today makes it difficult for physicians to know what choice is the best); MEDICAL
LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 14 (there is "considerable variation among phy-
sicians themselves about what constitutes acceptable practice in many facets of medicine").
156. R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 94.
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,113.
158. The section of the Act that requires insurance companies and physicians to report
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stroys a physician's right to be presumed innocent.1 59 While losing the pre-
sumption of innocence may not rise to the level of being guilty, it will
blemish the physician's professional reputation as long as the information
remains in the data bank. 160 Because the Act requires all facilities at which
a physician practices to check the data bank routinely, a physician has little
hope that the medical community will forget a mistake the physician made
early in his or her career.
Like most professionals, physicians rely on their reputations to foster the
success of their practice."'6 Colleagues and patients refer others to the phy-
sician for medical care because of the physician's reputation. 162 These refer-
rals perpetuate more referrals, but only if the physician's reputation remains
positive. Thus, a physician's reputation is second in value only to the physi-
cian's medical license.
When a board disciplines a physician, or when a patient sues the physi-
cian, claiming malpractice, the physician's reputation must suffer some ef-
fect. If either action results in a report about the physician in the data bank,
the physician's reputation is frozen in the computer's memory chips. As a
result, a physician may experience a wide variety of difficulties. Colleagues
may lose respect for the physician, patients may turn to other physicians,
income may fall, or peer review groups may deny the physician privileges at
various facilities.
163
As time passes, the physician will not know whether the information in
the data bank is stifling career advancement and causing other losses, or
whether his or her present performance causes any current problems. As
more time passes, the relevancy of the disciplinary action to the physician's
current skills and performance lessens. Yet, the physician's reputation is
held captive in the data bank and follows the physician everywhere he or she
payments made to settle malpractice claims carries with it a presumption that the payment
does not mean that the physician actually committed malpractice. Id. § 11,137(d).
159. Cf Shattuck, supra note 72, at 1002 ("Computer-matching can turn the presumption
of innocence into a presumption of guilt.").
160. The Act does not fix the period of time for which records must remain in the national
data bank. The DHHS published its intent to keep information in the data bank throughout
the life of the physician, plus 15 years. New System of Records, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,721, 34,724
(1987). DHHS arrived at this time period because medical imposters often attempt to assume
the identity and credentials of deceased physicians. See R. DERBYSHIRE, supra note 5, at 105-
11.
161. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 197-98.
162. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1502 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1658
(1988) (describing how physicians at the hospital where Patrick worked referred patients to
other hospitals instead of to Patrick, even when Patrick was physically at the hospital).
163. Cf Gerety, supra note 85, at 287 (describing potential problems arising from auto-
mated information used to approve mortgages or hire job applicants).
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seeks to practice medicine.'"4
Part B of the Act creates the possibility of a more frightening scenario if a
board erroneously reports to the data bank a physician whom it has not
disciplined. If a licensure board report to the data bank includes a typo-
graphical error, for example, the reversal of two digits in a medical license
number, a physician could suffer the same harm as a physician the licensure
board has disciplined.165 However, in such a case, the innocent physician
probably would not know that a board had reported him or her to the data
bank. 1
66
Once a report harms a physician's reputation, there is no cure. Even if the
physician were to win a monetary judgment against the government or a
disciplinary group for its error, and even if a court ordered the government
to delete the damaging information from the data bank and to contact every
organization to which the government released the damaging information,
these actions would not make the physician whole. People who simply
heard about the physician's problems by word-of-mouth would not receive
official retractions the government might issue. Despite the amazing capa-
bilities of modern computers, they are no match for gossip, innuendo, and
rumor. 1
67
IV. PHYSICIANS ON THE ATTACK
The Act brings two of the most powerful forces in our society, the federal
government and physicians, into open and direct conflict.' 68 It injects the
federal government into a realm historically governed by the states. 69 It
places physicians under a federal spotlight intended to facilitate actions that
164. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11,135, 11,137.
165. For example, the National Council of State Boards of Nursing issued its October 1987
disciplinary report identifying Sarah Jane Smith, license number 14,286, as the subject of a
disciplinary action in Colorado. Letter from Karen D. Brumley, Program Administrator,
Board of Nursing, State of Colorado, to Bruce Immerman, United States Public Health Service
(Nov. 25, 1987). The agency that employs Ms. Smith full-time contacted the Colorado state
board for more information. Id. The Board responded that Sarah Jane Smith had never been
licensed in Colorado, that the license number reported belonged to Linda Mary Brown, whose
license was suspended in 1986, not October 1987, and that Colorado had issued a license to a
Sarah Stafford Smith, but no disciplinary action was ever taken against her. Id. The Board
concluded its letter by questioning the legitimacy of its own report. The names in this footnote
have been changed to protect the nurses' privacy.
166. Cf. Letter from Bruce Immerman, United States Public Health Service, to nurse erro-
neously identified in disciplinary action report (Dec. 18, 1987) (nurse identified in disciplinary
report because of error in recording her license number).
167. See Gerety, supra note 85, at 287.
168. See Iglehart, supra note 14, at 964.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 31-42.
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would deprive them of their livelihood.17 0  The Act seeks to accomplish
these goals by a controversial method-sharing derogatory information
through a federal computer.
171
Because a physician's ability to practice medicine freely is of great value,
the government should take actions that will impair a physician's ability to
practice medicine only when necessary to vindicate a more important inter-
est or right, 172 and only after providing the physician with due process of
law.173 When drafting the Act, Congress should have asked whether a par-
ticular provision of the Act promotes the government's interest in protecting
public health and safety to a degree that outweighs the physician's interest in
his or her unimpaired ability to practice medicine. 174
Congress apparently failed to perform this balancing test. As a result,
several provisions of the Act seem to infringe on individual rights protected
by the Constitution, such as equal protection of the law, 175 freedom from
unreasonable government searches and seizures, 176 personal privacy free of
governmental intrusion, 177 and due process of law prior to governmental
deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 178 Because individual physicians
have much to lose and little to gain from the Act, physicians probably will
challenge the constitutionality of the Act itself, in addition to challenging
disciplinary actions taken against them. While Congress may have the
170. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,101; see also Waxman, supra note 2, at 943.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
172. Courts have used this reasoning in other contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno,
107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987) (community safety outweighs the liberty interest of a criminal
suspect denied bail pending trial); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986) (the govern-
ment's interest in efficient operation of its welfare programs outweighs a beneficiary's interest
in not obtaining a social security number because of religious beliefs); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 602 (1977) (vital interest in reducing illegal narcotic traffic outweighs privacy interest of
patient for whom narcotics are prescribed); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15-17, at 969 (1978) ("[W]here exposure of potentially derogatory information about
an individual serves a significant governmental purpose, such exposure is not automatically
unconstitutional. The key point to note is that a valid and sufficient governmental purpose
may not be presumed lightly .... ").
173. Because a license to practice medicine has been described as a property right, Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889), the government must provide procedural due
process before it impairs that right. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
174. See, e.g., Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2102-03 (the government's interest in protecting the
public from dangerous criminals outweighs a criminal's interest in liberty).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
177. The exact source of the right to privacy has not been finally decided, but Justice
Douglas, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), found privacy rights emanating
from the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth, amendments, id. at 483-85; see also Peck, supra
note 82, at 902-03.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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power to preclude causes of action at common law 179 or created by stat-
ute, 180 the Supreme Court has never permitted Congress to bar all suits chal-
lenging the constitutionality of an act.i8 1
Constitutional analysis of a statute starts with a presumption that an act
of Congress regulating public health and safety is constitutional, 1 2 and con-
tinues with a valuation of the interest the statute advances., 83 The interest
allegedly injured by the statute, or a specific provision of the statute, deter-
mines the burden the physician must overcome to defeat the challenged pro-
visions of the statute.'
84
A. Equal Protection Analysis
The equal protection clause of the Constitution ensures that when a gov-
ernment treats similarly situated individuals differently, the government has
179. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
180. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104-10 (1985) (Congress can legislate to deny
substantive rights to further legitimate legislative objectives); see also Patrick v. Burget, 108 S.
Ct. 1658, 1665 n.8 (1988) (referring to immunity provisions of the Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act), rev'g, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986).
181. See Barlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 704-07 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2.
182. "[S]tatutes come to us clothed with the authority of Congress and attended by a corre-
spondingly heavy presumption of constitutionality." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 676
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
183. The government's interest in a legislative objective can range from plausible, United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980), to compelling, United States v.
Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2102-03 (1987). The government's interest in regulating public
health and safety leans toward compelling. See, e.g., Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2102
("[G]overnment's regulatory interest in community safety can . . . outweigh an individual's
liberty interest."); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (government's interest in stopping fraud and abuse of welfare is compel-
ling); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (government's interest in controlling illegal
distribution of narcotics is vital). Consequently, the governmental interest the Act advances
should be considered compelling. However, if a specific provision of the Act fails to promote
public health and safety, and some do fail, as discussed infra at text accompanying notes 185-
95, then the physician's burden in challenging that provision of the Act will decrease.
184. The government's interest can override every individual right, including a fundamen-
tal right such as the right to life, provided the governmental interest being promoted is suffi-
ciently compelling. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342-59 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (examining the validity of possible legislative purposes for capital punishment). If
the Act tangibly harms some fundamental right of the physician, a reviewing court will give
strict scrutiny to the means by which the Act accomplishes its objectives. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). If the Act
harms some interest that is less than a fundamental right, the value of that interest to the
physician will determine the level of deference the Court gives to the specific provision of the
Act the physician is challenging. See, e.g., supra note 183, cases and accompanying discussion.
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a legitimate reason for doing so.' 5 If no legitimate reason for the disparate
treatment exists, the government may not impose the discriminatory treat-
ment. On its face, the Act appears to treat physicians, and all other health
professionals subject to state licensure,' 86 the same. However, certain provi-
sions of the Act are discriminatory when applied." 7
A physician could argue that section 11,132 of the Act, which requires
licensure boards to report every disciplinary action they take to the data
bank,' violates the equal protection clause. Because one state may disci-
pline conduct that another state may not,'8 9 two physicians who have en-
gaged in the same conduct, but who are licensed by different states, will not
be treated alike under the Act. The public, however, has an equal interest in
learning about both physicians.
If State A routinely places all physicians with drug abuse problems on
probation,' 9 ° but State B takes no action in a similar case, only the licensure
board in State A will report the physician to the data bank. Thus, only the
physician in State A will suffer the harm that may flow from being labeled a
drug abuser in a data bank that his or her professional community routinely
checks.
This disparate treatment perpetuates and exacerbates the problem Con-
gress hoped to eliminate with the Act. Under section 11,132, physicians in
State B are free to go from state to state because no information about their
drug abuse exists in the data bank. The data bank will report physicians
from State A to states like B, even though states like B are not interested in
the report because they do not impose sanctions on physicians for drug
185. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (gov-
ernment had no legitimate interest in forbidding mentally retarded individuals from living in
the neighborhood).
186. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,115(c).
187. Under current equal protection analysis, a physician could attack the facial validity of
the statute, as well as its validity as applied. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.2 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter J. NOWAK]. Attacks on
facial validity are extraordinarily difficult to make because the physician would need to show
that the Act would not be valid under any set of circumstances. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2100.
An attack on a specific provision of the Act, as the government applies it to the physician,
would be easier to maintain because the physician would need to show only that a provision
has no rational relationship to the Act's objectives. See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597.
188. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,132.
189. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 26-27.
190. The state of Maryland conducts a rehabilitation program for impaired physicians,
aimed at helping physicians overcome problems amenable to treatment, like drug abuse. See
Commission Sometimes Takes Years to Act in Incompetence Cases, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1988,
at A6, col. 2. Under the program, Maryland has allowed physicians who abuse drugs to keep
their licenses to practice medicine, but places these physicians in a probationary status. See
Rehabilitation at Work: Dr. Coombs, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1988, at A6, col. 1.
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abuse. By deferring to state disciplinary standards, section 11,132 also could
cause the migration of substandard physicians into states that have relaxed
disciplinary standards, and that consequently make few reports to the data
bank. 9 Once licensure boards realize how seriously a report to the data
bank may affect a physician's career, boards may become even more reluc-
tant to take disciplinary actions, 92 particularly those actions triggered by
minor violations of professional standards. Boards may prefer to take an
"all or nothing" approach to discipline once reporting is required. None of
these results furthers Congress' objectives.
The reporting requirements imposed on licensing boards are significantly
overbroad and underinclusive. t93 Congress could use means that are more
closely tailored to achieving the Act's objectives and at the same time avoid
the inequities that section 11,132 imposes on physicians. For example, Con-
gress could require reports from licensure boards only when the boards take
disciplinary action to restrict, suspend, or revoke a physician's license for
more than thirty days. This standard is comparable to the reporting require-
ments imposed on health care facilities under section 11,133.194 Congress
could also draft a list of the types of physician incompetence and misconduct
that boards must report in all cases. This would ensure a uniform level of
protection against incompetency throughout the entire country.'9"
B. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
While the equal protection clause protects groups of citizens from dis-
191. A physician could argue that the Act creates an impermissible burden on the right to
travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), because once the data bank starts reporting
a physician's disciplinary record, he or she may not be able to obtain a license or privileges in
another state. Consequently, the physician might be forced to remain in the state that took the
disciplinary action and be denied an opportunity to move elsewhere for a new beginning. Be-
cause the Supreme Court has considered the right to travel as fundamental in some cases,
abridgment of this right might trigger strict scrutiny analysis. Id. However, Congress specifi-
cally intended to impair the right to travel to prevent substandard physicians from evading
discipline by moving to another state. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 2-3, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6384-86. Thus, a right to travel challenge
would be almost identical to an attack on the facial validity of the statute because a reviewing
court would need to find Congress' objectives unconstitutional before the physician could pre-
vail. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 187, §§ 14.2, 14.38.
192. Cf F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 139-40 (physicians reluctant to report
substandard conduct to state licensure board due to fear that punishment of colleague, such as
suspension or revocation of license, may be disproportionately severe).
193. See J. NOWAK, supra note 187, § 14.2.
194. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,133.
195. Experts on physician licensing and discipline have recommended uniform standards
throughout the country, and Congress has considered several legislative proposals to create
uniform standards. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 8-9, 110-12.
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criminatory government practices, the fourth amendment's proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures protects the individual from certain types
of governmental intrusion. 196 The Act requires a variety of intrusions into
the personal affairs of physicians and requires the seizure of information that
physicians would prefer to keep hidden.
The Supreme Court analyzes cases dealing with violations of the fourth
amendment under the standard set forth in Katz v. United States. 197 Ac-
cording to Katz, government action implicates the fourth amendment only
when the government invades an area in which someone has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.' 98 A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
when the person has a subjective expectation of privacy and when society in
general would consider that expectation reasonable.1 99
The Act requires health care facilities and licensure boards to report infor-
mation about disciplinary actions and malpractice settlements to the data
bank. This information is not related to a physician's private life, but rather
to his or her public profession. Under the Katz analysis, a physician would
have a difficult time arguing that the public as a whole believes that the
physician has a privacy expectation in information concerning his or her
ability to practice medicine upon members of the public.2 "° Current fourth
amendment jurisprudence would not recognize a fourth amendment issue in
the provisions of the Act.20'
The Supreme Court has said that the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures protects people, not property.
20 2
However, a review of the Court's cases shows that in almost every case,
unless there is some tangible property involved, the Court usually will not
recognize any fourth amendment interest.20 3 Some legal scholars suggest
that the scope of the fourth amendment must be broad enough to protect
196. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
197. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
198. Id. at 351.
199. Id. at 351-52.
200. Cf Gerety, supra note 85, at 257-60. "[M]ost of us have very little power or expecta-
tion of power over the opinions and impressions others may form of us. Every affront to our
dignity in that outer world, while felt, even keenly, in our inner world, is not a legally cogniza-
ble assault upon our private selves." Id. at 259-60.
201. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 nn.6-7 (1985) (schools can search per-
sonal property of students to ensure compliance with school rules); see also Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977) (fourth amendment has never been extended to protect against
computer oversight).
202. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (no fourth amendment interest




intangible property, such as a person's reputation.2 "4
The seizure of a physician's reputation that the Act requires differs from
traditional fourth amendment problems because when the government seizes
a physician's reputation under the Act, the seizure continues as long as the
derogatory information remains in the national data bank. What may be a
reasonable seizure when it is a discrete event with a beginning and an end,
should become unreasonable when the seizure continues through time with-
out any opportunity for the physician to recover what the government
seized. 2 5 As government relies more and more on the almost perfect memo-
ries of computers, both Congress and the Court should have ample opportu-
nity to consider exactly at what point in time the fourth amendment begins
to afford protection.20 6
C. Fundamental Right to Privacy
Courts and legal scholars frequently debate whether the Constitution con-
tains a fundamental right of privacy.7' This Comment assumes that such a
right exists and that it is fundamental.208 Government recordkeeping about
a physician's professional competence should not implicate any general pri-
vacy interest. However, most cases2° 9 and commentaries2 10 that concern
government recordkeeping and government use of computers discuss the
government's potential to invade individual privacy through these activities.
204. See Peck, supra note 82, at 906-07; Shattuck, supra note 72, at 1002.
205. Cf. Gerety, supra note 85, at 288.
The threat of misuse becomes as permanent as the records themselves. The risks...
multiply not simply because of the heightened possibility of unconsented reproduc-
tion and distribution at any given time, but also because those possibilities, however
reduced by regulation, now extend indefinitely through time. Such a chronic and
enduring risk must count as itself an injury.
Id.
206. See Peck, supra note 82, at 911-12.
207. See Gerety, supra note 85, at 239 n.25.
208. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (right to privacy implied
in Bill of Rights); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (privacy is the "most comprehensive of rights"). See generally Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
209. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-07 (1977) (computerized records could
violate privacy rights); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-99 (1974) (Powell,
Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting separately) (dissenters express concern over ease
of governmental intrusion into privacy); Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(government records of arrests implicate right to privacy); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116,
1124 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (police records have potential to violate personal privacy).
210. See generally Gerety, supra note 85; Peck, supra note 82; Shattuck, supra note 72;
Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (1987); Note,
Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977).
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The Act gives a physician some privacy interest in the information col-
lected and disseminated by the data bank. It provides that information in
the data bank is confidential and that the government shall not disclose it,
except as required under the Act or as authorized under state law.2 1' This
provision provides little privacy because most states have freedom of infor-
mation laws that may require disciplinary groups to disclose information
obtained under the Act.
2 12
As time passes and the wrongful act that resulted in the physician being
reported to the data bank becomes more remote, the physician should de-
velop a privacy interest in the data bank information because the govern-
mental and public interest in the information about the wrongful act
decreases.213 An act that occurred when a physician just finished residency
training may not be relevant after the same physician has practiced for thirty
years without any other blemish on his or her record. Further, as the physi-
cian proves his or her value to society over time, the physician earns the
right to his or her current reputation without reference to a past mistake.
Yet, as long as the information remains in the data bank, the data bank will
report that information to every facility that considers extending privileges
to the physician, 21 4 and to every facility conducting the biannual credential
check that the Act requires.2 15
211. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,137(b).
212. Project, supra note 81, at 1163 n.1169 (1975); see also F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra
note 6, at 164-66.
One commentator on professional licensure asserts that licensure boards have been ineffec-
tive at self-regulation because disciplinary actions are unknown to the public. See S. GROSS,
supra note I, at 80-81. If the public knew the real level of a physician's professional compe-
tence, the commentator suggests, marketplace dynamics would cause consumers to stop using
less competent physicians in favor of those with high competency ratings. Id. Under this
theory, recognizing a privacy interest in physician's professional competence would defeat
Congress' purpose in enacting the Act.
213. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring) ("At some
point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy."). But see Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States, 816 F.2d 730,
741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Nor can we say that an older public record has lost its public interest
. ...."), cert  granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988) (No. 87-1379); cf Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469, 482 (1949) (An arrest can "even enhance the standing of the one who mends his way
and lives it down."); Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587, 589 (1977) ("[O]ur
secrets concern weaknesses that we dare not reveal to a competitive world .... past deeds that
bear no relevance to present conduct, or desires that a judgmental and hypocritical public may
condemn.").
214. Section 11,135 of the Act requires all health care facilities to check with the national
data bank to see if it contains derogatory information concerning a physician who has applied
to the facility for privileges. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,135.
215. Once a facility grants privileges to a physician, the facility must verify the physician's
licensure status every two years for as long as the physician has privileges. Id.
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With the Act, Congress created a computer network that is almost identi-
cal to computer networks it created to detect and prevent criminal activ-
ity.2" 6 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operates several of these
networks.2" 7 All federal and state law enforcement agencies report criminal
activity to, and obtain similar information from, these networks. Individuals
with records in the FBI network challenged its constitutionality shortly after
it was created, in Menard v. Saxbe,218 Tarlton v. Saxbe,21 9 and Utz v. Culli-
nane.220 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit heard all three cases and generally upheld the constitutionality of the
FBI network. However, the court in Cullinane expressed doubts about the
constitutionality of the FBI network when it contained records about indi-
viduals who had been arrested but not yet convicted, and those who courts
had exonerated of earlier convictions. 221 Because these two groups of indi-
viduals were presumptively innocent, the court said the FBI could not iden-
tify them as criminals in its computer network.222 However, the court
decided the case on other grounds, rendering the doubts expressed about the
constitutionality of the computer network dicta.
223
The government's interest in maintaining information about criminal ac-
tivity is far greater than its interest in a physician's disciplinary records.224
However, Congress has created a computer surveillance system for physi-
cians that is almost identical to the one Congress established for criminals, in
that both computer systems track their subjects for life.225 Courts have rec-
ognized that a criminal record can stigmatize an individual.226 Under the
Act, a physician may face similar stigmatization. In both cases, the stigma
216. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 816 F.2d at 732 & nn. 1-2, 733 & nn. 3-
4; Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 121-129, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 12 & 31 U.S.C.); Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Pro-
gram Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 5, 101 Stat. 680, 689 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
217. For a description of how the FBI uses the information it collects on criminal activity,
see Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 816 F.2d at 733 n.3.
218. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
219. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
220. 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
221. Id. at 478.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 483.
224. But see In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (license revocation proceeding is of a
quasi-criminal nature).
225. Compare Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States, 816 F.2d 730,
732-33, 738-42 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988) (No. 87-1379) with
National Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Health Care Practitioners, 53
Fed. Reg. 9264 (1988) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 60.13) (proposed Mar. 21, 1988) (specify-
ing no time period for which DHHS will keep the records).
226. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948) (arrest record can
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can have profound effects on an individual.22
In certain circumstances, courts permit an individual to have his or her
criminal record expunged.221 Congress should provide this same opportu-
nity to a physician whose conduct shows that he or she is not likely to repeat
the conduct that resulted in the disciplinary action. Because the Act does
not specify how long the data bank must keep individual disciplinary
records, the regulations implementing the Act could permit removal of the
record. Because the value of the record diminishes over time, at a certain
point in time a physician should be able to ask the DHHS to expunge the
disciplinary record. Even if the government's interest in protecting public
health makes it unwise to completely eliminate a record, the government
could remove the record to an inactive file and simply stop disseminating the
record routinely during the credential checks.
D. Due Process Analysis
1. When Due Process is Due
A physician's license to practice medicine is a constitutionally protected
property interest. 229 A physician's reputation may be a liberty interest mer-
iting similar protections. 230 A disciplinary group that reports a physician to
the data bank arguably affects both the physician's property and liberty in-
terests. Before the government can impair or deprive the physician of these
interests, the government must provide the physician with an opportunity to
be heard.231
cause variety of problems for record subject); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 491 n.24
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (arrest record blemishes individual's reputation).
227. Cf Gerety, supra note 85, at 287-88 (describing the effects of computer errors on
everyday activities).
228. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968-73 (D.C. Cir.) (people caught in mass
arrest during demonstration seek to have arrest record expunged), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (civil rights workers' arrest is
harassment); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (police arrested hippies to
harass them).
229. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191 (1898).
230. Cf Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 631-37 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (employee
dismissed after attempting to commit suicide alleged his liberty interest in his reputation was
violated when his former employer disclosed information about the suicide attempt without
providing the employee with notice); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)
(plaintiff's liberty interest in his reputation was violated when the police department distrib-
uted a leaflet to merchants identifying him as a drunk driver without providing an opportunity
for a hearing). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976) (reputation alone does not
constitute a liberty interest deserving protection under the due process clause).
231. Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Due process obligates the
government to accord an individual the opportunity to disprove potentially damaging allega-
tions before it disseminates information that might be used to his detriment.").
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Several provisions of the Act require a licensure board or peer review
group to report a physician to the data bank when the physician has not had
an opportunity to be heard because the physician surrendered his or her
license voluntarily.232 The physician is not entitled to procedural due pro-
cess regarding the voluntary surrender of privileges or a license. Only gov-
ernment action triggers the right to due process.233 However, if the
licensure board or peer review group reports that the physician surrendered
his or her privileges or license, the report itself could trigger a right to due
process.2 34 If the report contains allegations about the physician's compe-
tence or professional conduct, it could unfairly impair the physician's ability
to continue practicing medicine because the allegations have not been proved
and the physician has- had no hearing.
2 35
Even if a physician succeeds in a procedural due process challenge to this
type of report, the challenge will only buy time and an opportunity for a
hearing. If the physician fails to prevail on the merits, the licensure board or
peer review group must report the physician to the data bank, which will
disseminate the information.
2 36
The disciplinary group that reports to the data bank might avoid a suc-
cessful procedural due process challenge if the group limits its report to a
factual statement that the physician surrendered his or her privileges or li-
cense on a particular date. The disciplinary group also could adopt a policy
that in all cases, including a surrender of privileges or license, the group will
232. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11,132(a)(1)(B), 11,133(a)(1)(B). Congress intended these provisions
of the Act to keep physicians from "plea bargaining" with peer review groups and licensure
boards in a brotherhood of silence. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. However, a
physician may surrender his or her privileges voluntarily in response to improper pressure
from the peer review group, or because of a belief that the peer review group is incapable of
conducting an objective hearing. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
233. See, e.g., Codd, 429 U.S. at 627-28; Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437.
234. "The legality of government's program for ... dissemination might independently
violate a constitutional norm such as that of procedural due process even where no objection
exists to the way in which the information was obtained or retained by government." L.
TRIBE, supra note 172, § 15-17, at 972.
235. If the Act results in fewer physicians voluntarily surrendering their licenses, and in-
stead, fighting the board action, licensure boards might find themselves completely over-
whelmed with work. MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at i. However,
this is a gamble Congress decided to take. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 18, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6400-01.
236. "[I]f the hearing mandated by the Due Process Clause is to serve any useful purpose,
there must be some factual dispute between the employer and a discharged employee which
has some significant bearing on the employee's reputation." Codd, 429 U.S. at 627. But see id.
at 631 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I am not persuaded that a person who claims to have been
'stigmatized' by the State without being afforded due process need allege that the charge
against him was false in order to state a cause of action.").
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conduct a hearing prior to any reporting. The physician would then have an
opportunity to formally present his or her position. The licensure board or
peer review group could report both the physician's version of the incident
and its own, without making any formal findings or conclusions. Facilities
or groups that subsequently obtain the information from the data bank could
conduct whatever further investigation they deem appropriate.
When an insurance company or physician reports a malpractice settle-
ment to the data bank, no hearing is provided. In fact, no one could provide
any semblance of an objective hearing unless the physician litigated the
claim in a court. Presumably, the reason the, physician or insurance com-
pany settled the claim was to avoid going to court. Yet the Act forces the
physician or insurance company to choose between the expense and risk of
litigation, the only hope of complete vindication, and settlement with a re-
port to the data bank. Although the Act states that the settlement report
creates no presumption of malpractice,2 37 the report must have some signifi-
cance or reporting it to the data bank becomes meaningless and irrational.
Such law-making cannot stand.
2 38
Congress believed that malpractice settlement information might serve as
a warning that a physician might suffer competency problems.2 39 The report
casts a shadow on the physician's reputation by identifying him or her as
someone who needs to be watched. The physician must suffer some harm to
his or her reputation as a result of the report. Because a physician has no
opportunity to challenge a settlement report through a hearing, the settle-
ment reporting provision of the Act may violate the physician's due process
rights.24
2. When No Due Process is Due
Until a right or entitlement that the due process clause protects has at-
tached, a physician has no right to protect.241 Consequently, even due pro-
cess cannot protect a physician when a board refuses to grant the physician a
license or when a health care facility refuses to grant the physician privileges
in the first place. Thus, a physician cannot invoke the due process clause
when a licensure board or peer review group refuses to grant the physician a
237. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,137(d).
238. See J. NOWAK, supra note 187, § 3.3.
239. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 8, at 13-14, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6396.
240. Cf Shattuck, supra note 72, at 1004 (to the extent that "hits" in a computer match
have no hearing prior to government action based on the match, the "hits" have been denied
due process).
241. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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license or privileges based on a report received from the data bank about
prior misconduct or malpractice settlements, even if the conduct reported
took place years ago.
A licensure board or health care facility will be reluctant to admit a physi-
cian with a "record" into the organization because of the potential liability
the board or facility assumes if the physician's performance is substan-
dard.24 2 Even though the Act requires the board or facility to offer the phy-
sician a hearing in this situation,2 43 the immunity provisions of the Act
render the hearing meaningless because they bar the physician from chal-
lenging an unfavorable or unfair decision as long as the peer review group
can claim it acted to further quality health care. 2" The Act does not ad-
dress situations where a peer review group acts with a variety of motives, as
long as one motive is to further quality health care.245
This aspect of the Act is the most troublesome because peer review groups
and licensure boards can use the Act with impunity to deny a physician a
license or privileges. In this situation, the group that took the initial discipli-
nary action may have discovered that the physician's conduct did not war-
rant revoking the physician's license, but the action ultimately could have
that effect if another peer review group uses the first action to deny the phy-
sician a license or privileges to practice.
V. THE PROGNOSIS
Unlike most people, computers never forget.24 6 While no one claims the
Constitution contains a right to be forgiven,2 47 the Constitution does contain
provisions that elevate liberty and create a presumption of innocence.
248
The Act tarnishes both values because it holds a physician to a past mistake
and routinely reminds the health care community that the physician is, or
might be, guilty of the conduct that resulted in the information contained in
the data bank.
242. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 200-01.
243. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,151(10) defines professional review activity to include a decision to
grant clinical privileges.
244. A physician can still bring an action for discrimination against the peer review group
under the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e (1982). 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,111(a)(1).
245. "This immunity is not contingent on the propriety of the behavior of the peer review
body." Iglehart, supra note 14, at 962.
246. "Records are mechanical memories not subject to the erosions of forgetfulness and the
promise of eventual obliteration." Gerety, supra note 85, at 288.
247. Cf. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States, 816 F.2d 730, 739
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988) (No. 87-1379).
248. "[P]eople in the United States are not forced to bear a continuous burden of demon-
strating to the government that they are innocent of wrongdoing." Shattuck, supra note 72, at
1002.
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If the reputation and livelihood of a physician with a drug abuse problem
is measured against the life of a child who dies due to the physician's drug
abuse, few would give much weight to the physician. To the extent that the
government has the ability to prevent incompetent physicians from inflicting
harm on their patients and the general public, the government must do so by
the most effective means available. If the most effective means are regulation
and surveillance by computer, the government should take advantage of
those means.249 The Act's objectives and the use of computers to help meet
these objectives are laudable in theory. Unfortunately, the Act does not
properly apply the theory.
Congress gave insufficient thought to actual operation of the Act. Many
provisions of the Act will not accomplish the goals Congress set, although
these provisions, particularly the data bank part B creates, may harm some
physicians seriously.25 ° While Congress may ask physicians to bear legiti-
mate burdens imposed by the Act, many of the Act's reporting requirements
impose burdens without providing any offsetting benefits.25 1 The informa-
tion collected through these provisions often has no clear meaning.
252
Therefore, imposing these burdens on physicians without any noticeable
benefits seems fundamentally unfair.
The provision of the Act that mandates the reporting of malpractice infor-
mation perpetuates the mistaken but common belief that physicians can
practice mistake-free medicine. Medicine has not yet reached a point where
it can guarantee results or be risk-free.25 3 If Congress imposes such drastic
oversight on physicians for results they often cannot control, Congress cre-
ates a standard of care far above what the medical community can meet,
another fundamentally unfair result of the Act.25 4
249. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).
250. See supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
251. If a section of the Act fails to accomplish Congress' objectives, that section provides
no benefit to the public to offset the harm it may impose on the physician. For example, the
lack of a uniform national standard for licensure board reports, discussed supra in notes 188-92
and accompanying text, allows incompetent physicians from states with relaxed disciplinary
rules to practice with impunity. The malpractice settlement reports, discussed supra in notes
237-40 and accompanying text, by definition may not be interpreted to mean what they say, 42
U.S.C.A. § 11,137(d), so they too impose a burden without an offsetting benefit.
252. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,137(d); see also supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
253. "[M]edicine ... requires decisions that are often as much matters of judgment as of
science." Editorial, Beyond Tort Reform, 257 J. A.M.A. 827 (1987); MEDICAL LICENSURE
AND DIscIPLINE, supra note 6, at 14; Commission Sometimes Takes Years to Act in Incompe-
tence Cases, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1988, at A6, col. 1.
254. If physicians, the medical community, medical professional societies, and medical li-
censure boards disagree among themselves over everything from proper treatment methods to
disciplinary procedures, see sources cited supra note 253, the Act's immunity provision, 42
U.S.C.A. § 11,111, mandatory reporting of disciplinary actions, id. §§ 11,132-11,133, and
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Experts have questioned the effectiveness and objectivity of state licensure
boards for a long time.25 5 Licensure boards contribute to many problems
associated with physician incompetency and discipline.2 6 Yet, Congress
took no action to improve licensure board functions. Congress changed the
law to encourage these boards to do more of what they do, not to encourage
them to do it better. 2"7 Although Congress can claim it did not intend to
preempt state laws governing how licensure boards issue licenses and disci-
pline physicians;2 8 but Congress already has interfered by mandating fed-
eral oversight of licensure board activities. 259 Having done so, Congress
should have focused more attention on setting uniform standards for boards
to follow when they discipline physicians. If conduct in one state merits
sounding a nationwide alert, that same conduct committed in other states is
equally objectionable and licensure boards should report it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Physician licensing boards and peer review groups are sometimes similar
to the incompetent physicians they try to discipline. From time to time they
do a good job, but they often are ineffective. Critics say they always have
been. Congress must have concluded as much, sub silentio, when it decided
to invade an area that states have dominated exclusively. However, Con-
gress erred by not going far enough. By deferring to state standards of what
physician conduct is subject to disciplinary action, Congress crippled the
success of its own initiative and perpetuated the inadequacies of the state
systems in a federal computer. If the problems incompetent physicians
cause are compelling enough to warrant some invasion of state sovereignty,
$10,000 fines for failing to report malpractice settlements, id. § 11,131(c), could create chaotic
conditions for physicians attempting to practice medicine consistent with what they learned in
medical school.
255. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 6, at 1.
256. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
257. With their new immunity from most suits, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,111, disciplinary boards
should take more disciplinary actions if they previously failed to act because they feared trig-
gering lawsuits. Delays Plague System Regulating Physicians, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1988, at
A7, col. 5. However, the Act does not affect state standards used to issue licenses, see supra
note 33, nor does it provide more funding or staff to help the already overloaded boards thor-
oughly develop cases presented to them. These are also critical problems facing disciplinary
groups. See supra note 52.
258. See supra notes 112-14, 150.
259. The Act affects licensure boards in many ways. It requires boards to report discipli-
nary actions to the DHHS, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11,133, provides significant immunity to board
members involved in board actions, id. § 11,111, and imposes sanctions on boards that fail to
report disciplinary actions, id. § 11,132(d).
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and they may be, then Congress should have set its own standards to tell
states what physician conduct is unacceptable in all cases.
Computer regulation is exceptionally effective. Use of computers to iden-
tify and track physicians who truly are substandard or incompetent will be
cost-effective and, barring power failure, reliable. Unfortunately, computers
are only as accurate as the information that they contain. In light of the
problems within the various disciplinary groups, the groups will not always
report accurate information. Innocent physicians may suffer serious harm
under the Act, either because they cannot obtain relief from improper disci-
plinary action due to the immunity provisions of the Act, or because they
fall victim to erroneous data in the national data bank.
Congress should modify the Act to eliminate the inconsistencies and ineq-
uities. If Congress makes the modifications necessary to avoid constitutional
conflict and protect innocent physicians, the Act will have the impact that
Congress intended. If Congress makes these changes, a substandard physi-
cian will find it very difficult to evade disciplinary action, because computers
do not forget and computers do not compromise.
Kathleen L. Blaner*
* The author was an employee of Department of Health and Human Services at the
time this Comment was written. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and in no way represent or reflect the official views of the DHHS or its employees.
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